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Synopsis
This article provides an overview of the limitations of checking out a few cases
to prove conjectures in mathematics. To that end, I present a purposeful col-
lection of number-theoretic conjectures where extensive checking of cases has
found counterexamples, with emphasis on the historical backgrounds. Historical
examples of long-term attempts to prove or disprove such conjectures could help
individuals to realize more deeply that a limited number of observations does
not guarantee the correctness of a conjecture, even though there may be many
examples in its favor.
Keywords: conjectures, counterexamples, disproving conjectures, rejected
conjectures
1. Introduction
A natural starting point to come up with mathematical rules is to look at
a few of cases. Checking out a few cases may lead individuals to make
some conjectures. Sometimes, these conjectures are turned into formulas or
rules after the determination of their truths through mathematical proof, and
sometimes, further examination disproves them. There are also cases where
several mathematicians have attempted to solve a conjecture for many years,
even though no proof or counterexample has been found yet.
Hanna and Barbeu [4] argue that conjectures play a significant role in math-
ematical development, and, like the experts in other fields, mathematicians
use them. De Villiers [15] presents the function of conjecturing as “look-
ing for an inductive pattern, generalization, analogy, and so on” (page 398).
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Hanna and Barbeu [4] also express the idea that conjectures help us guide
mathematical generalizations towards valid results. Moreover, a brief look
at the history of mathematics shows that by testing conjectures, mathe-
maticians have achieved important results. From an educational viewpoint,
Warren and Cooper [16] note that examining the truth of a conjecture is a
mathematical activity. This activity has some interesting outcomes arising
from long-term attempts to prove or disprove conjectures.
This article provides an overview of the limitations of checking out a few
cases to prove conjectures in mathematics. To this end, I present a purposeful
collection of number-theoretic conjectures where extensive checking of cases
has found counterexamples. I also include some historical background on
some of these conjectures.
2. Attempts to prove or disprove conjectures
As Knuth [7] says, “Certainly not all conjectures and theorems lend them-
selves to constructing explanatory proofs or to generating explanatory coun-
terexamples” (page 489). Among good examples, one can mention the four-
color theorem and Fermat’s last theorem, both proved in the twentieth cen-
tury, after decades (or centuries) of effort. On the other hand, however, are
other conjectures that have not been proved yet; many mathematicians are
still working on them. These include the twin prime conjecture (the con-
jecture that there are an infinite number of twin primes) and the Goldbach
conjecture the conjecture that every positive integer can be expressed as the
sum of two prime numbers).
While making conjectures and trying to determine their validity are useful
mathematical activities, proving or disproving conjectures, even as a simple
school practice, is not often an easy task; and such exercises may prove to
be challenging not only for the students but also for the teacher. Part of
the difficulty comes from the fact that “[b]efore constructing a proof for a
true statement or generating a counterexample for a false one, students and
teachers need to be able to accurately decide the truth or falsity of a given
proposition” [8, page 68].
Studies also emphasize that undergraduate students and mathematics teach-
ers have difficulty verifying the truth and falsehood of a given statement.
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There is a good deal of evidence here which shows that among common in-
valid methods used to examine the validity of a statement are working with
examples to obtain conclusions [5, 6], and relying on empirical findings [1, 7]
as valid criteria of proof. Rips and Asmuth [11] use the expression proof by
multiple examples or example-based proof strategy to denote these types of
“proofs”.
The examination of multiple examples, putting significant weight on obser-
vation, helps to reinforce the correctness of a statement, so these criteria are
usually considered as valid methods by students, but our students are not
alone; there is much historical precedent for people believing in the truth of
a statement due to a preponderance of validating instances.
3. The Weight of Observations and Finding Counterexamples
A glance at the history of mathematics shows that there is evidence for
generalization of patterns based on a limited number of observations; in
other words, observation of a number of examples has often been used by
past mathematicians as a justification for the truth of a general assertion.
According to Hanna and Barbeu [4], “[f]or the early Egyptians, Babylonians
and Chinese, in fact, the weight of observational evidence was enough to
justify mathematical statements as well” (page1). Shahriari [12] also asserts
that once it was thought that if a result is correct for twenty consecutive
steps, it will be true for the rest.1
What might be unpleasant to encounter for some while testing cases to verify
a conjecture is a counterexample. During the process of the examination of
a conjecture, if we encounter a counterexample at any point, we reject the
conjecture, because in mathematics, “[o]ne counterexample is enough to say
that the statement is not true, even though there will be many examples in
its favor” [13, page 17]. This might be confusing for some students, but it is
after all a fact of (mathematical) life.
1 This might be familiar to our students. Stylianides and Stylianides [14] quote a pupil
saying “Checking 5 cases is not enough to trust a pattern in a problem. Next time I work
with a pattern problem, I’ll check 20 cases to be sure” (page 7).
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Sometimes, a counterexample is found in the early stages. For example,
in the examination of the conjecture “every positive integer is equal to the
sum of two integer squares”, in the case n = 3, a counterexample is found.
Consider the conjecture “if n is prime, then 2n − 1 is prime”. When this
statement is true, then 2n− 1 is known as a Mersenne prime. The first value
of n that gives a counter-example to the conjecture is 11.
211 − 1 = 2047 = (23)(89).
Consider the proposition “there is no natural number n such that the number√
89n2 + 1 is a natural number”. If one is to give a counterexample through
the examination of the natural numbers, they will not be successful soon.
But if one is not discouraged and keeps examining, the first counterexample
will be found at value n = 530000 [12]:
89(53000)2 + 1 = 250001000001 = 5000012.
For
√
61n2 + 1, one needs to be much more patient and continue until the
226153980th step:
61(226153980)2 + 1 = 17663190492.
Similarly, the conjecture that the number
√
1141n2 + 1 is not an integer for
all n ≥ 1 is false via the following counterexample (see [10, page 60]):
n = 30 693 385 322 765 657 197 397 208.
Stylianides and Stylianides [14] use the term Monstrous Counterexample to
describe this type of counterexample.
According to [12], the Polish mathematician Sierpinski succeeded in finding
the smallest number n with 29 digits, for which the number 991n2 + 1 is a
perfect square, as follows:
n = 12 055 735 790 331 359 447 442 538 737.
From this it follows that the number
√
991n2 + 1 is not always an irrational
number.
In the next section we look at several historical examples of conjectures
introduced by mathematical celebrities, and later rejected either by others
or simply through the passing of time.
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4. Rejected conjectures
Most conjectures are considered stronger the longer they survive, but for
some predictions, the opposite may happen. In 1532, Stifel predicted that
the world would end on October 19, 1533. In 1953, Napier tried to prove that
the end of the world would take place in the years between 1688 and 1700,
and his book ran through twenty-one editions [2]. However, the passage of
time showed that their predictions were wrong.
In mathematics, a conjecture becomes stronger over time, requiring a valid
proof to make one accept it, or a counterexample to reject it. However, there
are some examples of conjectures rejected after a long time. For example,
in 1769 Euler conjectured that for every natural number greater than 2, at
least n integers raised to the nth power are required to provide a sum that is
itself an nth power. After many years, in 1966, Lander and Parkin rejected
the conjecture through the following counterexample [2]:
275 + 845 + 1105 + 1335 = 1445.
Another example is Euler’s conjecture that had not been proved for many
years. This conjecture asserted that there were no integers, x, y, z, and w
such that x4 + y4 + z4 = w4. After almost 200 years, Noam Elkies presented
the following counterexample to disprove the conjecture [15]:
2, 682, 4404 + 15, 365, 6394 + 18, 796, 7604 = 20, 615, 6734.
As another example, we look at Fermat, who conjectured that all the Fermat
numbers Fn = 2
2n + 1 are prime. This conjecture was rejected by Euler in
1732 through the following counterexample:
F5 = 2
32 + 1 = 4294967297 = 641 · 6700417.
According to [12], based on long tests, the Russian mathematician Grave
guessed that if p was a prime number, then the number 2p−1 − 1 would
not be divisible by p2. It was later shown that this proposition fails for
p = 1093 since the number 21092−1 is divisible by 10932. However, as we have
observed so far, finding a counterexample is not easy, while, as mentioned
in [1], from the perspective of logic, it should perhaps be trivial because one
counterexample is enough to reject a conjecture.
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Sometimes the effort to find counterexamples continues even after a proof is
found by others. This can be characterized as distrust in proofs. We explore
this concept in the next section.
5. Distrust in Proofs
There are many problems in the history of mathematics that remained open
as conjectures for a long time. We already have proofs for some of these today,
and yet people try to prove or disprove them. Examples of this distrust can
also be found in the history of mathematics. The problem of the Quadrature
of the Circle is a famous example.
Here the statement is that it is not possible to construct a square with the
same area as a given circle using only a finite number of operations of a
straightedge and compass. A counterexample to the statement would be an
algorithm for compass and straightedge that accomplished the task.
In 1775, the French Academy of Sciences was deluged with proposed coun-
terexamples, all of which turned out to be incorrect. The Academy math-
ematicians eventually took the profound step of deciding that they would
no longer examine any solution of this problem [2]. Note that this is over a
hundred years before the logical proof that squaring the circle was impossi-
ble! All numbers constructable with compass and straightedge are algebraic,
so if squaring the circle were possible, then
√
pi would need to be algebraic.
Lindemann showed in 1882 that pi is transcendental and therefore so is
√
pi.
Today problems of doubling the cube and trisecting the angle are almost in
the same condition.
Here is a still-open problem involving pi. A real number is called simply
normal whenever in its decimal expansion all digits appear with limiting
frequency 1/10. It is normal when the limiting frequency of any group of k
numbers is 1/10k. It is not resolved even now if pi is normal, simply normal,
or neither. Consider trying to calculate pi to many digits in order to test!
No finite number of calculations can resolve this question either affirmatively
or negatively. That being said, all experimental evidence points to pi being
normal.
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6. Concluding Remarks
Here, the significance of proof in mathematics becomes visible. Even long
consecutive observations cannot make one sure of the validity of a conjecture
and, as noted, at any time somebody may provide a counterexample and thus
reject an old conjecture. As Hanna and Barbeu [4] state, “. . . it seemed to be
accepted in the nineteenth century that all continuous functions defined on
an interval had a derivative at virtually all the points in the interval. Karl
Weierstrass was able to give an example of a function that was continuous
but did not have a derivative anywhere” (page 6).
Our historical citations and examples here indicate that no weight of ob-
servations should suffice to conclude the truth of a conjecture. Historical
discussions of concepts can throw light on knowledge construction and cre-
ation of better understanding through the path traveled. After reviewing
conjectures that historically had remained unresolved for a long time, we
should probably know that, at any moment, the validity of a conjecture may
be rejected by a counterexample, although it may not be so soon, and “there’s
no endpoint at which you can stop and be sure that no counterexamples will
be found” [11, page 22].
After great efforts, Guy [3] presents his best formula of The Strong Law of
Small Numbers, as follows:
There aren’t enough
Small numbers to meet the
Many demands made of them. (page 707)
Moreover, as mentioned, counterexamples and proofs have an essential role
in the development of mathematics and, as Ko and Knuth [9] state, they are
important tools in deepening understanding of mathematics.
From a humanistic perspective, we know that attempts to prove or disprove
conjectures have often led to new insights in mathematics. From a ped-
agogical viewpoint, historical examples of the longterm attempts to prove
or disprove the conjectures could help students to realize more deeply that
a limited number of observations does not guarantee the correctness of a
conjecture, even though there may be many examples in its favor.
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The various examples in the paper also point towards a better understanding
of how human efforts have led to the development of mathematics through
new results. Here we explored a range of conjectures; some were eventually
proven to be correct and others were eventually refuted. The correct conjec-
tures illustrate once again the central role of proof in mathematics, while the
refuted ones highlight the importance of counterexamples.
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